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Abstract 
 
Crowdfunding has become an important research 
area, but we know little about how rewards influence 
fundraising success. This research-in-progress studies 
reward-based crowdfunding through a behavioral-
economics lens. We draw on dual-process theory and 
provide preliminary evidence for the middle-option 
bias in crowdfunding. Two empirical studies in a sim-
ple, controlled environment confirm the significance of 
the middle-option bias, both for varying numbers of 
donation options and for varying price ranges. Since 
our findings suggest that the positioning of rewards in 
a menu of rewards can influence support behavior and 
how much money project creators collect, they can 
inform the design of crowdfunding projects. Our future 
research will develop a mock crowdfunding website to 
study the middle-option bias in a more realistic envi-
ronment.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Crowdfunding is the practice of collecting small 
amounts of money for entrepreneurial, charitable, or 
creative projects from a large number of people, typi-
cally moderated by Internet websites [3]. Reward-
based crowdfunding, implemented by popular websites 
like Kickstarter and Indiegogo, has become particular-
ly common on the Internet [37]. A distinct feature of 
reward-based crowdfunding websites is that, while 
backers do not receive anything financial (e.g., shares 
or interest) in return for their money, they can receive 
non-monetary rewards, such as the chance to pre-
purchase the product or to receive tokens of apprecia-
tion (e.g., autographs or meet-and-greets) [7]. 
With its broad adoption in practice, the reward-
based model of crowdfunding is receiving increasing 
attention from researchers [32]. In particular, research-
ers have studied what determines fundraising success, 
including project design and description, networking 
effects and communication behavior, and the project 
creators’ experience and background [e.g., 22, 30, 31, 
37]. Still, crowdfunding research remains in its infan-
cy, and several research gaps remain [32]. In particular, 
with few exceptions [e.g., 26, 51], the design of reward 
menus has seldom been studied. While some research-
ers have found that the number of rewards influences 
fundraising success [e.g., 31], the selection of reward 
tiers and the determination of the donation amounts to 
which they are connected have not been studied in suf-
ficient depth.  
Against this background, this research-in-progress 
studies the design of reward menus through a behav-
ioral-economics lens. We present preliminary results 
from two empirical studies—an experimental study 
and an observational study—and hypothesize that the 
positioning of rewards in a reward menu influences 
backers’ decisions. Specifically, we provide prelimi-
nary evidence for the middle-option bias [16, 49] in 
crowdfunding, so our results suggest that project crea-
tors may have a way to position rewards that collects 
more money and reaches funding targets more quickly. 
This early-stage research focuses on internal validity 
by isolating the middle-option bias in a simple, con-
trolled environment, and our future research will test 
the middle-option bias in a more realistic environment 
to establish ecological validity. 
Section 2 provides background on reward-based 
crowdfunding, and Section 3 reviews related work. 
Section 4 explains the middle-option bias and presents 
the paper’s hypotheses. Section 5 explains the overall 
research design, and Sections 6 and 7 present the re-
sults from the two empirical studies. Section 8 discuss-
es implications and limitations and provides an outlook 
on future research. 
 
2. Reward-based crowdfunding  
 
Crowdfunding is big business. The crowdfunding 
industry grew from $6.1 billion in 2013 to $16.2 billion 
in 2014 and to an estimated $34.4 billion in 2015 [36]. 
Many thousands of crowdfunding projects have been 
funded successfully, and over one hundred of them 
have raised more than $1 million [50]. An ongoing 
crowdfunding initiative for the video game Star Citizen 
had collected more than $124.1 million funds at last 
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count [43]. With its broad success in practice, crowd-
funding has become a hot research topic in the area of 
crowd science [38], triggering research in disciplines 
like entrepreneurship, management, finance, market-
ing, and information systems [10]. Even so, a common 
definition of crowdfunding has not yet emerged, alt-
hough several researchers have offered definitions and 
conceptualizations [11]. Many researchers have dis-
cussed the meaning of crowdfunding based on the 
closely related term “crowdsourcing” [1], which refers 
to outsourcing jobs or tasks to a large, often anony-
mous group of people (the “crowd”) in the form of an 
open call [25]. Crowdsourcing often follows the idea of 
the “wisdom of the crowd,” according to which collec-
tive ideas and judgments are often as good as, or even 
better, than those of single individuals [44]. Against 
this background, crowdfunding can be understood as a 
form of micro-task crowdsourcing that collects finan-
cial instead of intellectual contributions [39].  
The idea of collecting small amounts of money 
from a large number of people for funding projects and 
ventures is not new, similar funding approaches have 
been used for centuries; for example, the Statue of Lib-
erty was funded by small donations from American 
and French people [32]. That crowdfunding has recent-
ly gained so much momentum can be attributed to the 
emergence of the Internet, which allows broader partic-
ipation than ever before [11].  
A variety of crowdfunding websites populate the 
Internet, serving as intermediaries between project 
creators and the crowd and managing most of the activ-
ities involved in the crowdfunding process [24]. 
Crowdfunding websites usually follow one of four 
models that are distinguished based on what backers 
receive for their financial contributions [9]: In dona-
tion-based crowdfunding (e.g., ammado), which is 
typically used to fund charity projects, backers do not 
receive anything tangible in return for their money 
[e.g., 13]. In lending-based crowdfunding (e.g., Kiva), 
backers provide loans and usually receive interest in 
return, so this model is most common for microfinance 
and private credits [e.g., 14]. In equity-based crowd-
funding (e.g., Crowdcube), backers receive shares, 
dividends or voting rights for their money, so this 
model relies on traditional investment mechanisms and 
is typically used for small-business funding [e.g., 12]. 
The fourth model is reward-based crowdfunding (e.g., 
Kickstarter), which is in the focus of this paper. 
In reward-based crowdfunding, which has become 
common in the creative industries [2], backers receive 
something non-financial, whether material or immate-
rial, in return for their money—that is, a reward. For 
example, a film-funding campaign typically involves 
material rewards like the chance to pre-purchase the 
Blu-ray or DVD, and immaterial rewards like film 
roles, visits to the film set, or thanks in the film credits. 
Reward-based crowdfunding can follow either of two 
basic principles: “all-or-nothing” and “keep-it-all” 
[17]. Projects that follow the all-or-nothing principle 
are funded only if a predefined funding goal is reached 
within a set timeframe; otherwise, the backers get their 
money back and the project creators receive nothing 
[24]. In the keep-it-all approach, project creators re-
ceive however much they collect [9]. The all-or-
nothing approach is usually considered as less risky for 
backers, while the keep-it-all approach is less risky 
from the project creators’ viewpoint [17]. For example, 
Kickstarter follows the all-or-nothing principle, while 
Indiegogo allows project creators to choose between 
the two alternatives.  
Building on this discussion and previous definitions 
[8, 37, 42], we define reward-based crowdfunding as 
the practice of collecting small amounts of money—
usually to fund creative projects and usually through 
the Internet—from a large number of people in the 
form of an open call that follows either the all-or-
nothing or keep-it-all principle, in exchange for some 
material or immaterial reward. 
 
3. Related work  
 
When crowdfunding initially emerged as a funding 
practice on the Internet, much of the related research 
was dedicated to equity-based crowdfunding [10], but 
reward-based crowdfunding has since increasingly 
received more attention [32]. Several empirical studies 
have explored the factors that determine fundraising 
success [e.g., 22, 30, 31]. Based on the funding princi-
ple (i.e., keep-it-all vs. all-or-nothing), success has 
most often been measured either as the amount of 
money collected during the funding period [e.g., 51] or 
as whether the funding goal was reached during that 
period [e.g., 30]. 
Most crowdfunding-success research has used the 
project itself as the unit of analysis, so researchers have 
often studied fundraising success from the perspective 
of project design [32]. Crowdfunding websites typical-
ly share the same design features [30], so researchers 
have used similar factors to explain fundraising suc-
cess. We organize these factors into five broad catego-
ries in what follows: project size, project creator, 
presentation, communication, and rewards (Table 1). 
We conceptualize project size as a function of the 
funding goal and the duration of fundraising. Defining 
smaller projects, that is, shorter durations and lower 
funding goals, has usually been found to increase the 
chances of success [e.g., 30, 37], but there are also 
contradicting results. For example, Frydrych et al. con-
cluded that funding duration does not have a signifi-
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cant effect on project success [22]. The project crea-
tor’s social network, measured as his or her number of 
friends on online social networks, has also been found 
to influence the success of crowdfunding projects posi-
tively [37]. In addition, the creator’s own backing his-
tory—that is, the number of projects that the project 
creator has backed—has been found to be significant 
[54].  
Table 1. Selective overview of related work 
Category Factor References 
Project size Duration [37, 52] 
 Funding goal [22, 37] 
Project creator Social network [37, 52] 
 Backing history [30, 54] 
Presentation Visualization [30, 31] 
 Description [51, 53] 
Communication Updates [37, 51] 
 Posts and comments [31, 37] 
Rewards  Number of rewards [31, 51] 
 Pricing [26, 51] 
Presentation refers to the use of texts, images, and 
videos to describe and advertise projects. Videos and 
images have been found to positively influence fund-
raising success [30, 31], and the depth of the project 
description has been identified as another success fac-
tor [51]. For example, Zhou et al. concluded that the 
quality of a project’s argument is positively associated 
with fundraising success [53]. 
On most, if not all, websites, the project description 
cannot be changed after project launch, so communica-
tion like updates, blog posts, and comments, which 
helps to keep backers and potential backers informed 
about the project’s progress, has been found to influ-
ence fundraising success [37, 51]. For example, Kunz 
et al. provided evidence that the number of blog posts 
increases the chances of project success [31].  
In short, researchers have found a variety of factors 
that help to explain fundraising success, but the over-
view of related work we provided represents only a 
limited account of crowdfunding research. Several 
other factors that are not directly related to project de-
sign have also been studied, including gender and race 
[e.g., 40]. However, despite the amount of research that 
has been performed on the factors of crowdfunding 
success, the most distinctive feature of reward-based 
crowdfunding—rewards—has seldom been studied. 
While some researchers have found that the number of 
rewards influences the chances of fundraising success 
[e.g., 31], the design of reward menus, including the 
selection of reward tiers and the donation amounts 
connected to them, has largely been neglected. Xiao et 
al. provided first evidence that comparably high-priced 
rewards positioned at the end of the choice set lead to 
significantly higher success rates [51], and Hu et al. 
argued that, given two product options of similar quali-
ty but at different prices, buyers with high product val-
uations prefer the high-priced option, as long as they 
perceive that other buyers may have low product val-
uations [26]. Still, even though researchers have started 
to explore crowdfunding success from the viewpoint of 
the reward menu’s design, we know little about how 
rewards, and how they are presented, influence crowd-
funding success. As the next section explains, this pa-
per uses theory from behavioral economics to explore 
how reward menus can be designed to reach funding 
targets more quickly and make crowdfunding cam-
paigns more successful. 
 
4. Middle-option bias 
 
Research in the area of behavioral economics, 
which is located at the intersection of psychology and 
economics, deals with decision-making, often at the 
individual level [15]. Behavioral economists not only 
explore utility maximization [21], but also how per-
sonal attitudes affect decision-making [4] and how 
deviations from rationality can be explained [27]. To 
explain the differences between normative and descrip-
tive decision-making (i.e., decisions that do not max-
imize individual utility), behavioral economists have 
drawn on the dual-process theory [23], which also pro-
vides the conceptual background for the present study.  
According to the dual-process theory, decisions are 
the result of two separate cognitive thinking processes: 
“System 1” (e.g., unconscious, automatic, quick, and 
effortless) and “System 2” (e.g., conscious, controlled, 
slow, and effortful) [20]. Individuals often do not com-
prehensively search for or thoroughly interpret infor-
mation because their cognitive capacity is limited and 
because decision-making can be complex [35] and can 
require effort [18]. To cope with these limitations, 
people apply cognitive heuristics and simplified strate-
gies—System-1 processing in the language of the dual-
process theory. For example, people tend to draw on 
reference points because they provide orientation and 
make it easy to make decisions quickly [41]; if no ref-
erences are available, they tend to apply heuristics 
[48].  
The deliberate application of cognitive heuristics 
and biases by modifying the “choice architecture” 
[46]—also referred to as “nudging” [29]—allows peo-
ples’ behavior to be altered in a predictable way [33]. 
System-1 thinking is associated with a number of well-
known cognitive biases that can be used to nudge peo-
ple [33], including the herd effect (i.e., people tend to 
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follow the crowd when making decisions) [34], loss 
aversion (i.e., losses hurt people twice as much as 
equivalent gains make them feel happy) [28], and sta-
tus-quo preference (i.e., people are reluctant to change 
and prefer the current state of affairs) [28].  
Another well-known bias is the middle-option bias 
[5, 16], which is in the focus of the present paper. The 
middle-option bias, which researchers have also called 
“centrality preference,” “edge avoidance,” and “the 
center-stage effect,” reflects people’s tendency to se-
lect “safe” options that are positioned in the middle of 
a choice set [49]. Researchers have confirmed the ro-
bustness of the middle-option bias in several applica-
tion scenarios, including the process of selecting re-
stroom stalls [16], cereal snack bars [29], and items in 
supermarkets [16]. However, as several studies have 
also delivered contradictory findings [6, 19], the validi-
ty of the middle-option bias in reward-based crowd-
funding remains to be assessed. In this kind of crowd-
funding, the middle-option bias may be at play be-
cause, from the backers’ perspective, crowdfunding 
can be understood as a problem of choice: given their 
willingness to support a project financially, they have 
to decide how much they wish to donate based on the 
rewards offered. Backers may be prone to the middle-
option bias because crowdfunding campaigns often 
involve innovative and novel products and rewards for 
which potential backers have only limited or no refer-
ence points. Therefore, we hypothesize:  
H1: Backers tend to choose the donation option in 
the middle. 
Confirming this hypothesis contributes to theory on 
how to design and present crowdfunding projects. If 
reward menus can be designed in a way that backers 
select the middle option more often than any other, 
project creators could reach their funding targets more 
quickly. For example, they could drop low-priced re-
wards from the reward menu so that higher-priced re-
wards appear in the middle, allowing them to collect 
more money from those who select the middle option. 
This, of course, can only apply under certain condi-
tions; among others, crowdfunding projects are diverse 
in terms of the number of donation options they offer, 
and options can vary considerably in price range [22, 
51]. Therefore, we test two sub-hypotheses: 
H1a: Backers tend to choose the donation option in 
the middle, independent of the price range. 
H1b: Backers tend to choose the donation option in 
the middle, independent of the number of options. 
As the next section explains, we tested hypothesis 
H1a and hypothesis H1b separately in two empirical 
studies. 
5. Study design 
 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted an experi-
mental study and an observational study. The experi-
mental study tested the significance of the middle-
option bias for donation options with varying price 
ranges (hypothesis H1a), while the observational study 
tested the same effect for varying numbers of donation 
options (hypothesis H1b). We recruited participants 
from prolific.ac, an online crowdsourcing platform for 
scientific studies, for both studies.  
Table 2. Donation options in the two studies 
 Coins 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
Experimental study: varying price ranges 
Book 
Cheap       
Moderate       
Expensive                 
Movie 
Cheap       
Moderate       
Expensive                 
Video game 
Cheap       
Moderate       
Expensive                 
Observational study: varying numbers of options 
3 options         
5 options         
7 options          
At the beginning of each study, we provided partic-
ipants with general information concerning tasks and 
payment, followed by three fictitious crowdfunding 
scenarios of similar length and structure. The three 
scenarios featured crowdfunding for a book, a movie, 
and a video game, respectively, so they represented 
three of Kickstarter’s most common project categories: 
publishing, film and video, and games. The description 
of the three projects, for which we used Qualtrics for 
presentation purposes, was based on several successful 
Kickstarter campaigns [see 45 for a more detailed de-
scription of the three project scenarios]. For each of the 
three scenarios, participants selected a donation option. 
Table 2 shows how the donation options were distrib-
uted across the three scenarios in the two studies (the 
middle options are highlighted in dark).  
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We defined the studies’ currency as “coins,” with 
an exchange rate of 1 coin = 1 pence. Participants were 
given 50 coins as a budget for each project. We de-
signed the crowdfunding scenarios as all-or-nothing 
projects, so participants were told that projects would 
only be successful if a pre-defined funding goal was 
reached. (They were not informed about the total 
amount donated or the number of backers.) In both 
studies, the book project had a funding goal of 900 
coins, the video game a goal of 1,350 coins, and the 
movie a goal of 1,800 coins. As participants did not 
self-select into a real-life crowdfunding campaign, 
there was no opt-out option, so they had to provide 
funding for all projects with their 50 coins. 
Payment was designed to reflect how backers expe-
rience project success (“reward”) and failure (“loss”) in 
real-life crowdfunding. Therefore, participants re-
ceived a participation fee of £1 and variable bonus 
payments based on their donations to a randomly se-
lected project such that, if that project was successful 
(i.e., if the sum of all individual donations exceeded 
the project’s funding goal), participants’ donated coins 
were doubled (reward), and if the project was not suc-
cessful, they lost their coins (loss). For example, if a 
participant had backed a successful project with 25 
coins, and if that project was randomly selected for the 
bonus payment, his or her bonus payment was 75 
pence (50 coins (budget) – 25 coins (donation) + 50 
coins (reward) = 75 coins). 
Finally, participants completed a follow-up survey 
from which we collected demographic data. We used 
the statistical software package R—in particular, the 
package multgee for repeated-measures ordered lo-
gistic regression modelling—for data analysis [47]. 
 
6. Experimental study: Price range 
 
Participants and design. We recruited ninety-four 
participants for the first study, which tested the signifi-
cance of the middle-option bias for donation options 
with varying price ranges (i.e., hypothesis H1a). The 
mean age was 32.1 years, and 61.7 percent were men. 
The experimental design was repeated-measures sin-
gle-factorial, and the conditions were three scale types 
of price ranges—cheap, moderate, and expensive—that 
differed across projects. (That is, each participant pro-
vided funding for each of three projects—repeated 
measures—in a certain condition.) For example, partic-
ipants could decide to back the book project with 5, 10, 
or 15 coins in the cheap-scale condition, with 10, 15, or 
20 coins in the moderate-scale condition, and with 15, 
20, or 25 coins in the expensive-scale condition (Table 
2). We randomly assigned participants to the scale 
conditions. Because of the repeated-measures design, 
we had 282 observations in total: ninety-four observa-
tions in the cheap scale, ninety-six in the moderate 
scale, and ninety-two in the expensive scale.  
Table 3: Decision positions and scale conditions 
 Dependent variable: Decision position 
  1: First  2: Middle 3: Last 
   Book project 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 S
ca
le
 c
on
di
tio
n 
1: Cheap  5 10 15
2: Moderate  10 15 20
3: Expensive  15 20 25
  Movie project 
1: Cheap  10 20 30
2: Moderate  15 25 35
3: Expensive  20 30 40
  Video-game project 
1: Cheap  15 25 35
2: Moderate  20 30 40
3: Expensive  25 35 45
Measurement. For each project, each participant 
had three donation options to choose from. We defined 
the dependent variable as the position of the donation 
option in the choice set (i.e., first, middle, and last). 
Across all choice sets, the donation options grew more 
expensive from first to last, so we coded the decision 
position as an ordinal variable (1 = first, 2 = middle, 
and 3 = last). The treatment (i.e., the scale condition) 
was coded as a nominal variable (1 = cheap, 2 = mod-
erate, and 3 = expensive) (Table 3). Age and gender 
were used as control variables.  
  
Figure 1. Overview of results across scenarios 
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Results. Figure 1 provides histograms for the re-
sults of the experiment, aggregated across scenarios. 
Forty-six of the ninety-four cheap-scale decisions were 
in the middle, and participants who had either the 
moderate scale or the expensive scale also tended to 
choose the middle option more often than other options 
(forty-seven and thirty-four decisions, respectively). 
Across all scales, 45 percent of the participants chose 
the middle option, as opposed to 33 percent, which 
would have been expected with random selection. 
Table 4. Ordered logistic regression results 
 Dependent variable:  
Decision position (ordinal) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Treatment 
(scale)  
 0.14 
(0.15) 
0.15 
(0.15) 
Age   -0.00 
(0.01) 
Gender   -0.23 
(0.25) 
Intercepts    
01 (first | mid-
dle) 
-1.05*** 
(0.14) 
-1.33*** 
(0.31) 
-1.00† 
(0.58) 
02 (middle | 
last) 
0.89*** 
(0.14) 
0.62* 
(0.31) 
0.95† 
(0.57) 
Obs. 282 282 282 
Notes: † p < 0.1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 
standard errors are in parentheses. 
To test our hypothesis H1a (i.e., backers tend to 
choose the donation option in the middle, independent 
of the price range), we specified a repeated-measures 
ordered logistic regression model. The ordinal multi-
nomial response variable was the decision (i.e., first, 
middle, last option) in the three scenarios (i.e., book, 
game, movie project). As we assume that responses are 
correlated (each participant selected a donation option 
for each of the three projects), we fitted the following 
marginal cumulative logit model [47]:  
logit(ijp) = 0j + 1 Scale typei + Controlsi + ui + i, 
where ijp denotes the cumulative probability of re-
sponse level j (j = 1, 2 for the three decision positions; 
i.e., level 1 from the first to the middle option, and 
level 2 from the middle to the last option) for subject i 
(i = participants 1, 2, ..., 94) and project p (p = 1, 2, 3 
for the book, game, and movie, respectively). Scale 
typei denotes the subject-specific treatment (i.e., the 
scale condition), Controlsi are the control variables Age 
and Gender, and ui is a random effect designed to cap-
ture the non-independence between the decisions (i.e., 
the outcome variable) observed for the same subject i 
across the projects p (i.e., observations from the same 
subject might be correlated). 
Table 4 presents the results of the repeated-
measures ordered logistic regression model. Model 1 is 
an intercept-only model, Model 2 adds the scale-
condition treatment, and Model 3 adds the control vari-
ables. To find support for H1a, we expect a significant 
effect between the first and the middle option and be-
tween the middle and the last option (01 and 02), but 
no significant effect of the treatment (i.e., the scale 
condition). In other words, we expect the selected do-
nation option to be in the middle, independent of the 
scale. As predicted, 01 and 02 are significant across 
all model specifications, though the significance de-
creases with higher price ranges (i.e., in Models 2 
and 3), and the treatment has no significant effect on 
the decision (Model 2: treatment = 0.14, p < 0.35; Mod-
el 3: treatment = 0.15, p < 0.32). As the treatment re-
mains insignificant when we add the controls, we used 
the simpler Model 2 for further analysis. 
Table 5 shows the category probability regarding 
the outcome variable (i.e., decision = 1, 2, or 3) for 
Model 2. With respect to different treatment condi-
tions, the model estimates that 44 percent would 
choose the middle option.  
Table 5. Category probability (Model 2) 
 Decision position 
 1: First 2: Middle 3: Last 
Cumulative logit — -1.33 0.62 
Cumulative odds 
[exp(Cum.logit)] — 0.26 1.85 
Cumulative proportion 
[1/1+exp(Cum.logit)] 1.00 0.79 0.35 
Category probability 0.21 0.44 0.35 
In conclusion, the experiment’s results indicate that 
people tend to choose the donation option in the mid-
dle, independent of the price range. 
 
7. Observational study: Number of options 
 
Participants and design. For the second, observa-
tional study, which tested the significance of the mid-
dle-option bias for varying numbers of donation op-
tions (i.e., hypothesis H1b), we recruited another nine-
ty-two participants. The mean age was 31.3 years, and 
53.3 percent were men. To test the robustness of the 
middle-option bias we observed in the first study, we 
compared three, five, and seven donation options (Ta-
ble 2). We assigned participants randomly to these 
conditions. As with the first experiment, each partici-
pant selected a donation option for each of the three 
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scenarios, resulting in another repeated-measures de-
sign. Some participants made their decisions very 
quickly, which made in unlikely that they have thor-
oughly read and understood the project descriptions. 
Therefore, we excluded those decisions from the sec-
ond dataset that were made within less than fifteen 
seconds. As a result, we had seventy-nine observations 
for the three-options condition, eighty for the five-
options condition, and seventy-three for the seven-
options condition. 
Table 6: Decision positions and numbers of options 
 Dependent variable: Decision position 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
   Book project 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 N
um
be
r o
f o
pt
io
ns
 3 options   15 20 25 
5 options   10 15 20 25 30
7 options  5 10 15 20 25 30 35
  Movie project 
3 options   15 20 25 
5 options   10 15 20 25 30
7 options  5 10 15 20 25 30 35
  Video-game project 
3 options   15 20 25 
5 options   10 15 20 25 30
7 options  5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Measurement. While our first study tested the ef-
fect of the donation-option scale (e.g., 5/10/15 vs. 
10/15/20 vs. 15/25/30 coins), the second study tested 
the same effect for varying numbers of donation op-
tions. We defined the dependent variable as the posi-
tion of the donation option in the choice set. (That is, 
participants had three options to choose from in condi-
tion 1, five options in condition 2, and seven options in 
condition 3; see Table 6.)  
 
Figure 2. Overview of results across scenarios 
For all projects, the three-options scale was 
15/20/25 coins, the five-options scale was 
10/15/20/25/30 coins, and the seven-options scale was 
5/10/15/20/25/30/35 coins. Accordingly, the 20-coins 
option provided the middle option in all scales. 
Results. Figure 2 provides histograms for the re-
sults of the second study, aggregated across scenarios. 
For the three-options choice set, thirty-nine out of sev-
enty-nine decisions were in the middle, which con-
firmed the results of the first study (not displayed in 
the figure). Participants who had the five-options 
choice set also tended to choose the middle option, as 
did participants who had the seven-options choice set 
(twenty-three and nineteen decisions, respectively).  
Table 7. Chi-square test results 
 Observations Expected p 
3 options  79 26.33 0.00 
5 options  80 16.00 0.01 
7 options  73 10.43 0.00 
As the dependent variable was measured on several 
levels (participants had to select one out of three, five, 
or seven options), we analyzed each condition sepa-
rately, making it an observational study. To evaluate 
the robustness of the middle-option bias with increas-
ing numbers of donation options and to test our hy-
pothesis H1b (i.e., backers tend to choose the donation 
option in the middle, independent of the number of 
options), we used the chi-square test for univariate 
frequency distributions. The test determines whether 
the observed values in each condition differ signifi-
cantly from an expected value (i.e., the mean of each 
condition). Table 7 shows the results of the chi-square 
test, which support our hypothesis that people choose 
the middle option more often than any other. 
Table 8. Log. regression results (intercept-only models)
 Dependent variable:  
Decision position (ordinal) 
 3 options  5 options 7 options 
01 (1 | 2)   -2.41*** 
(0.46) 
02 (2 | 3)  -1.10*** 
(0.29) 
-1.44*** 
(0.30) 
03 (3 | 4) -0.66* 
(0.28) 
-0.21 
(0.21) 
-0.53*  
(0.24) 
04 (4 | 5) 1.62*** 
(0.28) 
1.03*** 
(0.20) 
0.53† 
(0.29) 
05 (5 | 6)  2.94*** 
(0.61) 
1.96***  
(0.31) 
06 (6 | 7)   2.24***  
(0.36) 
Obs. 79 80 73 
Notes: † p < 0.1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
For each condition (i.e., 3, 5, and 7 options), we 
specified a repeated-measures ordered logistic regres-
sion model, so the specification was the same as in the 
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first study but did not include the treatment variable 
(i.e., intercept-only models). Again, we assume that 
responses are correlated, as each participant selected a 
donation option for each of three projects. Table 8 pre-
sents the results of the intercept-only models, particu-
larly the estimated log odds. 
As the coefficients shown in Table 8 cannot be in-
terpreted directly, we used the results of the repeated-
measures ordered logistic regression model to calculate 
the category probabilities (Table 9), following the 
same procedure that we used in the first study. Again, 
all models estimate that people tend to choose the mid-
dle option more often than any other. 
 
Table 9. Category probabilities  
 Coins 
  5 10 15 20 25 30 35
3 options   0.34 0.49 0.16 
5 options  0.25 0.20 0.29 0.21 0.05
7 options 0.08 0.11 0.18 0.26 0.25 0.03 0.10
In conclusion, the two empirical studies confirmed 
participants’ tendency to choose middle options more 
often than any other option, independent of both the 
number of donation options and the price range.  
 
8. Conclusions  
 
Crowdfunding is becoming an increasingly im-
portant funding mechanism. Still, many campaigns 
have remained unfunded, even though some of them 
were promising and failed for other reasons than quali-
ty [31]. Against this background, researchers have an 
interest in how to design and present crowdfunding 
projects in a way that increases the chances of fund-
raising success [e.g., 22, 30, 31].  
We studied fundraising success from a behavioral-
economics perspective. We drew on dual-process theo-
ry, arguing that crowdfunding backers may be prone to 
System-1 processing—unconscious and quick deci-
sion-making [20] that is associated with a number of 
well-known cognitive biases [48]—as projects and 
rewards are often novel and innovative and lack appro-
priate reference points. Specifically, we studied the 
middle-option bias and hypothesized that—if the re-
ward menu is deliberately designed—backers may 
choose the donation option in the middle more often 
than they choose other options. Two empirical studies 
in a simple, controlled environment confirmed our hy-
pothesis. 
Though this is research-in-progress, our prelimi-
nary results already have implications for practice. As 
the results suggest that crowdfunding backers may be 
prone to the middle-option bias, they can support pro-
ject creators in designing their reward menus to max-
imize their chances of meeting their funding targets. 
For example, they could drop low-priced rewards from 
the choice set so higher-priced rewards appear in the 
middle, thereby increasing the size of average dona-
tions.  
However, project creators should consider that 
dropping low-tier rewards from the menu may also 
cause some potential funders to drop out, so they are 
well-advised to use our results with caution when de-
signing their reward menus. Related studies have sug-
gested that higher numbers of rewards increase the 
chances of fundraising success [e.g., 31]. In fact, it is 
likely that the validity of the middle-option bias in re-
ward-based crowdfunding depends on some factors 
that are outside the scope of this early-stage research.  
In particular, the applicability of our results has 
four primary limitations. First, on most, if not all, plat-
forms, rewards are automatically arranged from cheap-
est to most expensive, which prohibits the offering 
from exploiting the full potential of the middle-option 
bias. Second, it is likely that participants in an online 
study are more prone to System-1 processing than are 
actual backers who invest real money (instead of 
“coins”) and receive real rewards in exchange for their 
donations (instead of small bonus payments). Third, we 
excluded some important individual-level variables 
from our study that influence backing behavior, includ-
ing personal income and preferences regarding projects 
and rewards. Fourth, we studied the middle-option bias 
for varying price ranges and numbers of options, but 
these variations were comparatively small. If the op-
tion in the middle of a reward menu has a significantly 
higher price than the others, it is also likely that the 
observed effect vanishes. The same may happen when 
the number of rewards is so high that backers have 
difficulty finding the middle. In our experiment, for 
example, the significance of the observed effect de-
creased with higher prices ranges. 
Against this background, our findings provide only 
preliminary evidence for the middle-option bias in re-
ward-based crowdfunding. However, our early-stage 
research focused on internal validity by isolating the 
middle-option bias in a simple, controlled environ-
ment. To establish ecological validity, and to provide a 
more realistic environment, we are developing a mock 
crowdfunding website that we will use to collect fur-
ther evidence for the middle-option bias and to test 
alternative cognitive biases that may influence backers’ 
choices, including the decoy effect [45]. This, we be-
lieve, will help us to more holistically understand deci-
sion-making in crowdfunding settings and to provide a 
foundation to further theorize on the design of crowd-
funding projects and websites.  
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